mirror of
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl
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bd6f41c308
... and then run clang-format on the changed files to reflow any comment blocks that exceeded line lengths. (Which generated a bunch of noise formatting changes, but probably that reduces noise in future CLs.) No semantic change to the code. Change-Id: I455da9faaaedda3e751ac91b5eb43cbc662d68a6 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/97367 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
246 lines
7.4 KiB
C++
246 lines
7.4 KiB
C++
// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include <openssl/stack.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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using namespace bssl;
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int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
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const auto *a_impl = FromOpaque(a);
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const auto *b_impl = FromOpaque(b);
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return X509_NAME_cmp(&a_impl->issuer, &b_impl->issuer);
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}
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int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
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const auto *a_impl = FromOpaque(a);
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const auto *b_impl = FromOpaque(b);
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return X509_NAME_cmp(&a_impl->subject, &b_impl->subject);
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}
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int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
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return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer);
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}
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int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) {
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return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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}
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X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) {
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// This function is not const-correct for OpenSSL compatibility.
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(a);
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return const_cast<X509Name *>(&impl->issuer);
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}
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uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash(const X509 *x) {
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_NAME_hash(&impl->issuer);
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}
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uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash_old(const X509 *x) {
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_NAME_hash_old(&impl->issuer);
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}
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X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) {
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// This function is not const-correct for OpenSSL compatibility.
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(a);
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return const_cast<X509Name *>(&impl->subject);
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}
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ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) {
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auto *impl = FromOpaque(a);
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return &impl->serialNumber;
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}
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const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) {
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(x509);
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return &impl->serialNumber;
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}
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uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash(const X509 *x) {
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_NAME_hash(&impl->subject);
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}
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uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash_old(const X509 *x) {
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const auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_NAME_hash_old(&impl->subject);
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}
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// Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
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// Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
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// arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
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// operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
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// certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
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// "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
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int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) {
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const auto *a_impl = FromOpaque(a);
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const auto *b_impl = FromOpaque(b);
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// Fill in the `cert_hash` fields.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the hash will be all
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// zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but
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// not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent
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// comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we
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// retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See
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// https://crbug.com/boringssl/355.
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x509v3_cache_extensions((X509Impl *)a_impl);
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x509v3_cache_extensions((X509Impl *)b_impl);
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return OPENSSL_memcmp(a_impl->cert_hash, b_impl->cert_hash,
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SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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}
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int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) {
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const X509_NAME_CACHE *a_cache = x509_name_get_cache(a);
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if (a_cache == nullptr) {
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return -2;
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}
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const X509_NAME_CACHE *b_cache = x509_name_get_cache(b);
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if (b_cache == nullptr) {
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return -2;
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}
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if (a_cache->canon.size() < b_cache->canon.size()) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (a_cache->canon.size() > b_cache->canon.size()) {
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return 1;
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}
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int ret = OPENSSL_memcmp(a_cache->canon.data(), b_cache->canon.data(),
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a_cache->canon.size());
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// Canonicalize the return value so it is even possible to distinguish the
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// error case from a < b, though ideally we would not have an error case.
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if (ret < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (ret > 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t X509_NAME_hash(const X509_NAME *x) {
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const X509_NAME_CACHE *cache = x509_name_get_cache(x);
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if (cache == nullptr) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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SHA1(cache->canon.data(), cache->canon.size(), md);
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return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md);
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}
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// I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
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// this is reasonably efficient.
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uint32_t X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x) {
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const X509_NAME_CACHE *cache = x509_name_get_cache(x);
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if (cache == nullptr) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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MD5(cache->der.data(), cache->der.size(), md);
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return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md);
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}
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X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk,
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const X509_NAME *name,
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const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) {
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if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 &&
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X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) {
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return x509;
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}
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}
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return nullptr;
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}
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X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) {
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return x509;
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}
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}
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return nullptr;
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}
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EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) {
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if (x == nullptr) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_PUBKEY_get0(&impl->key);
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}
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EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(const X509 *x) {
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if (x == nullptr) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return X509_PUBKEY_get(&impl->key);
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}
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) {
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if (!x) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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// This function is not const-correct for OpenSSL compatibility.
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auto *impl = FromOpaque(x);
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return const_cast<ASN1_BIT_STRING *>(&impl->key.public_key);
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}
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int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) {
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const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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if (xk == nullptr) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k) == 1) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (EVP_PKEY_id(xk) != EVP_PKEY_id(k)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
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} else {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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// Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
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// count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
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// each X509 structure.
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STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
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return sk_X509_deep_copy(chain, X509_dup_ref, X509_free);
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}
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